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AbstractThe potential abuse of power by public officials after they have left government employment became a major issue in Australia with the appointment of two recently retired senior federal ministers to lucrative positions with firms which had close dealings with their former departments. The cases raise important questions about the regulation of 'the revolving door' which is an increasing feature of governance as the public and private sectors move more closely together. Australian Commonwealth rules relating to both ministers and public servants are analysed in the context of international practice and as part of the wider issue of conflict of interest. Four types of conflict are relevant to post‐employment: ingratiation, profiteering, influence, and switching sides. The regulation of each type is discussed and Australian practice seen to be deficient in certain respects, particularly in relation to ministers. Regulation in this area faces two general challenges: definition of the offence and the comparative absence of oversight and sanctions. But international exemplars offer prospects for strengthening Australia's ethical regime.

"The Extended Scope of Accountability in Public Administration" published on by Oxford University Press.

The relationship between ministers and public servants has been a longstanding topic among students of Australian public administration. Recent debate has centred on issues of supposed politicisation and excessive responsiveness in the Australian Public Service (APS), caused, in part, by the weakened tenure of department heads (secretaries). The recent Moran report has little to say on this relationship. It endorses changes to the appointment processes for secretaries which are presumably designed to strengthen secretaries' independence from their political masters. It adopts a view of citizen-centred service and strategic leadership that appears to marginalise ministers. Its approach to public sector leadership is taken from international management theory that works well in a business context and in the United States (US) government system. It is less well-suited to Westminster-style systems.

The relationship between ministers and public servants has been a longstanding topic among students of Australian public administration. Recent debate has centred on issues of supposed politicisation and excessive responsiveness in the Australian Public Service (APS), caused, in part, by the weakened tenure of department heads (secretaries). The recent Moran report has little to say on this relationship. It endorses changes to the appointment processes for secretaries which are presumably designed to strengthen secretaries' independence from their political masters. It adopts a view of citizen-centred service and strategic leadership that appears to marginalise ministers. Its approach to public sector leadership is taken from international management theory that works well in a business context and in the United States (US) government system. It is less well-suited to Westminster-style systems.

Recent controversies over intelligence in Iraq, to give one example, have raised problems about the politicization of official advice from government, particularly what we are led to believe is factual or 'objective' advice. Objectivity is a contested value and the lines are often hard to draw between fact, spin and misrepresentation. Public servants are held to higher standards of objectivity than politicians, a fact on which politicians trade when they seek to attribute assessments of evidence to their officials. The growing openness of government documentation is placing pressure on departmental officials who wish to be both loyal to their political masters and honest in their factual assessments. These issues are discussed with reference to recent Australian experience (and also with reference to the UK Hutton Inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly.

This article analyses the main principles underlying public service responsiveness, illustrating them with examples drawn largely from recent experience in the Australian Commonwealth government. The final section attempts to identify some general international trends which are placing new strains on the relationships between politicians and public servants.

The recent trend to devolved and decoupled governance has raised issues of accountability. Are networks of independent actors and agencies more or less accountable than traditional government hierarchies under political control? The same question has long been posed of federations versus unitary systems. Accountability itself is a contested term with different versions placing more or less emphasis on external scrutiny versus internal responsibility and on rectification. Networks are stronger in the communicative stages of accountability (information and discussion) provided that the networks themselves are open and transparent. Hierarchies, however, offer better prospects of rectification, being less prone to buck-passing, provided that the head (as in ministerial responsibility) is personally accountable for exercising the obligations of collective accountability.

Recent controversies over intelligence in Iraq, to give one example, have raised problems about the politicization of official advice from government, particularly what we are led to believe is factual or 'objective' advice. Objectivity is a contested value and the lines are often hard to draw between fact, spin and misrepresentation. Public servants are held to higher standards of objectivity than politicians, a fact on which politicians trade when they seek to attribute assessments of evidence to their officials. The growing openness of government documentation is placing pressure on departmental officials who wish to be both loyal to their political masters and honest in their factual assessments. These issues are discussed with reference to recent Australian experience (and also with reference to the UK Hutton Inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly.

This article analyses the main principles underlying public service responsiveness, illustrating them with examples drawn largely from recent experience in the Australian Commonwealth government. The final section attempts to identify some general international trends which are placing new strains on the relationships between politicians and public servants.

The recent trend to devolved and decoupled governance has raised issues of accountability. Are networks of independent actors and agencies more or less accountable than traditional government hierarchies under political control? The same question has long been posed of federations versus unitary systems. Accountability itself is a contested term with different versions placing more or less emphasis on external scrutiny versus internal responsibility and on rectification. Networks are stronger in the communicative stages of accountability (information and discussion) provided that the networks themselves are open and transparent. Hierarchies, however, offer better prospects of rectification, being less prone to buck-passing, provided that the head (as in ministerial responsibility) is personally accountable for exercising the obligations of collective accountability.